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The recent case of Shumba & others v Park Cakes Ltd (31st July 2013) provided guidance on when payments can become contractually binding through custom and practice.

The Claimants were dismissed for redundancy. They claimed that they were unfairly dismissed and that they were entitled to enhanced redundancy pay on the basis that enhanced payments had been made over the years. The employment tribunal upheld the claims of unfair dismissal but the claims in relation to the redundancy payments were dismissed. Notwithstanding evidence in relation to past payments, the tribunal stated that it was "unable to infer that the enhanced terms were paid without exception".

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the EAT and held that the employment tribunal's failure to find that the enhanced redundancy benefits had been paid in the past on at least seven occasions was a material flaw in its reasoning. Accordingly, the case had to be remitted for re-hearing by a different tribunal.

At paragraph 36 of the Judgment, the Court of Appeal provided helpful guidance on when contractual rights concerning enhanced redundancy benefits may arise through custom and practice. The reasoning can also be used for other situations where custom and practice may create contractual rights.

"In considering what particular benefit is conferred as of right it is necessary to take account of all the circumstances known, or which should reasonably have been known, to them. ...... they will typically include the following:

(a) On how many occasions, and over how long a period, the benefits in question have been paid. Obviously, but subject to the other considerations identified below, the more often enhanced benefits have been paid, and the longer the period over which they have been paid, the more likely it is that employees will reasonably understand them to be being paid as of right.

(b) Whether the benefits are always the same. If, while an employer may invariably make enhanced redundancy payments, he nevertheless varies the amounts or the terms of payment, that is inconsistent with an acknowledgment of legal obligation; if there is a legal right it must in principle be certain. Of course a late departure from a practice which has already become contractual cannot affect legal rights; but any inconsistency during the period relied on as establishing the custom is likely to be fatal. It is, however, possible that in a particular case the evidence may show that the employer has bound himself to a minimum level of benefit even though he has from time to time paid more on a discretionary basis.

(c) The extent to which the enhanced benefits are publicised generally. Where the availability of enhanced redundancy benefits is published to the workforce generally, that will tend to convey that they are paid as a matter of obligation, though I am not to be taken as saying that it is conclusive, and much will depend on the circumstances and on how the employer expresses himself. It should also be borne in mind that "publication" may take many forms. In some circumstances publication to a trade union, or perhaps to a large group of employees, may constitute publication to the workforce as a whole. Employment tribunals should be able to judge whether, as a matter of industrial reality, the employer has conducted himself so as to create, in Leveson LJ's words, "widespread knowledge and understanding" on the part of employees that they are legally entitled to the enhanced benefits.

(d) How the terms are described. If an employer clearly and consistently describes his enhanced redundancy terms in language that makes clear that they are offered as a matter of discretion - e.g. by describing them as ex gratia - it is hard to see how the employees or their representatives could reasonably understand them to be contractual, however regularly they may be paid. A statement that the payments are made as a matter of "policy" may, though again much depends on the context, point in the same direction. Conversely, the language of "entitlement" points to legal obligation.

(e) What is said in the express contract. As a matter of ordinary contractual principles, no term should be implied, whether by custom or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the express terms of the contract, at least unless an intention to vary can be understood.

(f) Equivocalness. The burden of establishing that a practice has become contractual is on the employee, and he will not be able to discharge it if the employer's practice is, viewed objectively, equally explicable on the basis that it is pursued as a matter of discretion rather than legal obligation. This is the point made by Elias J at para. 22 of his judgment in Solectron.

Case: 

Court of Appeal in Shumba & others v Park Cakes Ltd.